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Abstract
Numerous media news items suggest on a daily basis that people tend to use harsher criteria when 
they judge immigrants than members of their own in-group. In the present research project, we were 
interested in studying individual justice judgments of a violation of a law by an Italian (in-group) or an 
immigrant (out-group) member and the influence of moral exclusion processes on the assessment. 
In particular, we examined whether those people who tend to exclude out-groups from their scope of 
justice will give such biased judgments and will adopt double standards, while inclusive people will 
not. A total of 255 people evaluated the seriousness of a crime in two different law-breaking scenarios 
in which the offender’s and the victim’s nationalities were systematically changed (either Italian or 
Romanian). Moreover, participants completed a scale measuring the moral inclusion/exclusion of other 
social groups. As hypothesized, participants who tended to exclude some groups from their moral 
community judged the Romanian more harshly than the Italian culprit. On the contrary, those people 
that tended to have a more inclusive moral community did not show any difference in evaluation. In 
conclusion, the present research highlights the importance of considering the effect of moral inclusion/
exclusion processes on the evaluation of justice events, especially in an intergroup context.
Resumen
Numerosas noticias en los medios sugieren que las personas tienden a usar criterios más severos 
cuando juzgan a miembros de grupos de inmigrantes que a quienes pertenecen a su propio grupo. 
Esta investigación tuvo como propósito estudiar los juicios morales que hacen los individuos ante la 
violación de una ley por parte de un miembro italiano (dentro del grupo) o un inmigrante (por fuera del 
grupo) y la influencia de los procesos de exclusión moral en la evaluación. En particular, se evaluó si 
los participantes tienden a excluir a quienes no pertenecen a su grupo, si emitían juicios sesgados 
y adoptarían una doble moral, mientras que las personas incluyentes no lo harían. Un total de 255 
personas evaluaron la gravedad de un crimen en dos escenarios diferentes de violación de la ley en 
los cuales las nacionalidades del delincuente y de la víctima se cambiaron sistemáticamente (ya sea 
italiano o rumano). Además, los participantes completaron una escala que mide la inclusión/exclusión 
moral de otros grupos sociales. Según la hipótesis, los participantes que tienden a excluir a algunos 
grupos de su comunidad, tuvieron un juicio moral más severo ante los rumanos que ante los italianos. 
Por el contrario, aquellos que eran más incluyentes, no presentaron ninguna diferencia en el juicio 
moral y la evaluación de la situación. En conclusión, la presente investigación destaca la importancia 
de considerar el efecto de los procesos de inclusión/exclusión moral en la evaluación de los eventos de 
justicia, especialmente en un contexto intergrupal.
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Introduction
Although it had been a source of migrants to other 
countries (e.g. America) during the previous centuries, 
in the last ten years Italy has had to deal with the 
phenomenon of immigration. The number of immigrants 
has risen from 1,549,373 in 2003 to 5,029,000 as of 
January 1st, 20171. Since the expansion of the European 
Union (EU), the most recent waves of migration have 
mainly been Eastern Europeans who replaced the North 
African populations as the largest immigrant group in 
Italy. From 2003 to 2017, Romanians increased their 
presence in the territory by 12.11% (from 95,039 to 
1,151,395), overtaking Albanians and Moroccans as 
the largest ethnic minority group in Italy. Although Italy 
does not have such a high percentage of immigrants with 
respect to its population as compared to other countries 
(7.5%, the tenth country with the highest proportion of 
immigrants in Europe according to Eurostat), the issue 
of immigration is constantly at the heart of media and 
political debates (see Passini, 2015) perhaps due to the 
fact that this is a recent phenomenon.
Starting from this context of intergroup tension, 
in this study we were interested in researching the 
issue of justice and violation of laws by Italians and 
immigrants. In particular, we examined whether Italians 
use different evaluation criteria (i.e. a double standard) 
in judging the violations of a law by an Italian (in-
group) or an immigrant (out-group) member. Indeed, 
some studies (e.g. van Dijk, 2000) suggest that when 
the culprits are out-group members, people often tend 
to judge the event more severely than when the culprits 
are in-group members. This different evaluation should 
not be considered to be a general trend. That is, not 
everyone applies such a prejudicial evaluation. In 
the present research project, we indeed consider the 
effects of moral exclusion processes on the evaluation 
of justice, with the idea that those people who tend to 
exclude out-groups from their scope of justice will give 
a biased judgment and will adopt double standards, 
while inclusive people will not (for a review see Jost & 
Major, 2001; Sullivan & Tifft, 2001).
Scope of justice and moral exclusion
As Van den Bos (2003) pointed out, considering how 
individuals form judgments of justice is a relevant issue 
for understanding how people behave in their social 
environments. Social psychologists define justice as 
a judgment people make about events and the desire 
for justice as an important motivator of human social 
behavior (see Tyler, Boeckmann, Smith, & Huo, 1997). As 
relates to justice, three distinct behavior realms may be 
1. Data were taken from the official reports of the Istituto Nazionale 
di Statistica (ISTAT, http://demo.istat.it), that is, the Italian National 
Statistical Institute.
distinguished (Hafer, Conway, Cheung, Malyk, & Olson, 
2012): those related to the distribution of resources or 
outcomes (i.e. distributive justice, see Deutsch, 1985), 
those related to decision-making procedures about 
distributions or outcomes (i.e. procedural justice, see 
Lind & Tyler, 1988), and those related to the treatment 
of those who are affected by decisions (i.e. interactional 
justice, see (Bies & Moag, 1986).
However, the literature on social justice has often 
ignored the fact that people do not always reflect and 
consider the issues of justice or fairness when they have to 
make judgments about a specific person or group (Hafer 
& Olson, 2003). That is, scholars have mainly examined 
the forms that justice takes but not whether justice is 
applied equally to different social groups. In particular, 
Opotow (1990) has theorized the relevance of the scope 
of justice, i.e. a psychological boundary for justice, such 
that “moral values, rules, and considerations of fairness 
apply only to those within this boundary for fairness, 
called our ‘scope of justice’ or ‘moral community’” 
(Opotow, 1990, p. 3). The concept of justice has indeed 
been linked to that of morality and is usually associated 
with the notions and perceptions of right and wrong 
(Hafer et al., 2012). Central to this line of thinking is 
the assumption that people “are born with an innate 
capacity to care about morality, and they are predisposed 
to maintain cooperative systems by rewarding those 
who behave morally and punishing those who do not” 
(Skitka, Bauman, & Mullen, 2008, p.1).
A moral community is defined as the group to 
which the rules of justice apply and it may be either 
narrow – referring to only a few people such as in-group 
members – or wide, as far as referring to the whole 
world community (see Passini, 2011, 2016). Inclusion 
or exclusion from the moral community is defined as 
processes of moral inclusion/exclusion. Moral exclusion 
processes refer to the exclusion of other individuals or 
groups from one’s own moral community, while moral 
inclusion processes involve the extension of social 
justice to groups that had formerly been excluded from 
the scope of justice. As Opotow (2008) has pointed out, 
we all have finite boundaries for justice, and processes 
of moral exclusion are ubiquitous in everyday life and in 
common intergroup relations. For instance, Passini and 
Morselli (2016) showed that morally exclusive scopes of 
justice had a predictive effect on more subtle forms of 
prejudice. In this sense, the construct of moral inclusion/
exclusion may be very useful for understanding 
intergroup relationships and the perception of justice 
related to in-group vs. out-group members. Indeed, 
Opotow’s theory suggests that people who consider a 
group to be excluded from their moral community should 
judge violation of a law by a member of this group more 
harshly than the same violation by an in-group member. 
On the contrary, people who include a group within 
their moral community should judge the violation of a 
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law the same regardless of the group membership of the 
person who is being judged. As Hafer and Olson (2003) 
have pointed out, certain variables such as perceived 
similarity with other groups influence the psychological 
boundary within which people believe that the rules of 
justice apply. Some research has indeed found effects 
of the perception of similarity or dissimilarity with the 
target group on prejudice or forgiveness. For instance, 
studies based on social distance theory (Bogardus, 1933) 
have suggested that the more groups are perceived as 
distant the greater the risk of attitudes of prejudice and 
discrimination towards them (e.g. Fontanella, Villano, & 
Di Donato, 2016; Norcini Pala, Villano, & Clinton, 2017; 
Passini & Villano, 2013; Stephan & Stephan, 2001). 
The aim of the present study was to analyze the 
influence of moral inclusion/exclusion processes on 
individual judgments concerning a law violation by an 
in-group vs. an out-group member. Participants were 
presented with various scenarios in which offender and 
victim nationalities were systematically changed. Because 
it’s the largest immigrant group in Italy, Romanian was 
chosen as the out-group nationality. Specifically, it was 
hypothesized that participants with exclusionary attitudes 
towards other groups from the moral community would 
evaluate offenders differently based on their nationality 
(harsher for Romanians) while participants with attitudes 
of inclusion of the other groups would not.
Methods
Participants
Participants were contacted via the Internet. An online 
questionnaire was constructed using Limesurvey, 
a survey-generating tool (http://www.limesurvey.
org). The questionnaire was publicly accessible and 
an invitation with the link to the questionnaire was 
emailed to potential participants by various methods 
(e.g. mailing lists, newsgroups, and social networking 
services). Moreover, so-called “snowball sampling” was 
used: i.e., a non-probability sampling technique where 
the participants were asked to re-send the questionnaire 
link to their acquaintances in order to recruit other 
participants. All the participants were informed that 
their contribution was voluntary (i.e., no fee was offered) 
and that their responses would be anonymous and 
confidential. The questionnaire was written in Italian. In 
order to check and prevent a person from reentering the 
survey site, the subjects’ IP addresses were monitored. 
That is, when two or more IP addresses were the same, 
the socio-demographic data were inspected in order to 
identify and remove duplicates. No case was found to 
meet these criteria and therefore no participant was 
removed. The data were collected in 2016.
A total of 255 Italian citizens (68.2% women) 
responded by accessing the website and filling out the 
questionnaire. Participant ages ranged from 18 to 72 
years old (M = 33.68, SD = 13.58). They were mainly 
born in the north of Italy (53.8%), while 37.2% and 
9.1% came from the center and the south, respectively. 
As regards their level of education, 7.5% declared they 
had finished middle school, 58.7% declared they had 
obtained a high school diploma, 33.1% had a university 
degree and 0.8% had a master’s or Ph.D. qualification. In 
terms of employment, 36.7% stated they were university 
students, 26.1% were white collar workers, 11.4% were 
teachers, 8.9% were self-employed, 7.3% were factory 
workers/craftsmen, 3.3% were unemployed, 2.9% were 
retired, and finally, 3.4% chose “other.”
Procedure
Participants were first asked to read two news items, both 
taken from recent events and adapted for the research 
project. As can be seen in Appendix, the first news item 
concerned a person being run over and killed by a drunk 
driver (drunk driver), while the second concerned a 
person who had died after a violent argument following 
a trivial dispute over a bus ticket (violent argument). 
Therefore, both scenarios involved manslaughter (i.e. 
an accidental killing) and under Italian law they are 
considered as equivalent in terms of culpability and the 
sentence imposed. The present study sought to make 
participants judge similar crimes in which the offender 
and the victim were different as concerns in-group 
and out-group membership. In this sense, the offender 
and the victim of the two news items were varied so 
that half of the participants responded to drunk driver 
with an Italian as the offender and a Romanian as the 
victim and to violent argument with a Romanian as the 
offender and an Italian as the victim. The other half of 
the participants had the nationalities reversed. The text 
was accompanied by a photo of the offender. The photos 
were taken from an internet search for average-looking 
Italian and Romanian men in their thirties.
Participants were asked to answer the following 
questions on a 7-point scale (from 1 = “not at all” to 
7 = “very much”): (1) how serious do you consider 
this offense to be? (seriousness); (2) how much anger 
do you feel towards the culprit? (anger) Additionally, 
participants were asked to write the number of years of 
imprisonment they would give the culprit, answering the 
question: (3) how many years of imprisonment should be 
given for this offense? (penalty). After that, participants 
were asked to answer the following measure.
Moral inclusion/exclusion of other groups (MIEG). 
The moral inclusion/exclusion scale constructed by 
Passini and Morselli (2017) was used. Participants were 
first asked to list from 2 to 4 ethnic/cultural groups 
other than their own that lived in their neighborhood. 
Subsequently, the MIEG items were applied to the 
listed groups. The most frequently named groups were 
Romanians (f = 100), Moroccans (f = 80), Albanians 
(f = 59) and Chinese (f = 58). Then, for each group 
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respondents were asked to choose where their position 
lay on a scale between two statements, the first of which 
identifying the group’s moral exclusion, with the second 
identifying the group’s moral inclusion. The items were 
bipolar, rated on a 7-point scale between +3 (moral 
exclusion) on the left and +3 (moral inclusion) on the 
right. The score was rescaled from -3 (indicating the 
most agreement with the moral exclusion statement) 
to +3 (indicating the most agreement with the moral 
inclusion statement). An example of exclusion is “I think 
that members of this group of people are extremely 
uncivilized” versus “I think that members of this group of 
people are extremely civilized.” In the original study, both 
an exploratory and a confirmatory analysis suggested a 
one-dimensional solution (see Passini & Morselli, 2017). 
A single score was therefore computed as the average of 
the four items for all the ethnic/cultural groups chosen 
by each participant (α = .95). Participants were classified 
as having a more inclusive attitude towards the groups 
considered based on a higher MIEG score.
Results
A chi-square test revealed no interaction between the 
participants’ gender and their nationality: χ2(1, N = 
255) = 0.16, p = ns. As shown in Table 1, in general 
the subjects considered the drunk driver news item 
more serious than the violent argument. They hoped 
for a lengthier prison sentence for the drunk driver, and 
this story generated more anger. 
Table 1. 
Means and T-Test differences for scenario and offender’s nationality among scenario variables.
Scenario Nationality
Measures MDrunk Driver
M
Violent Argument t d
M
Italian
M
Romanian t d
Seriousness 6.53 5.93 9.10*** .84 6.24 6.22 0.39 .04
Anger 5.48 5.20 2.79** .26 5.32 5.37 -0.48 -.04
Penalty (years) 19.69 15.86 2.97** .29 16.15 19.39 -2.50** .24
Note. Seriousness and anger extended from 1 to 7. Penalty (years) extended from 0 to 100.
*** p < .001. ** p < .01. * p < .05.
A two-way (Scenario: drunk driver vs. violent 
argument) ANCOVA with MIEG as a covariate was 
performed on each item (see Table 2). The interaction 
Scenario × MIEG was slightly significant on seriousness 
and penalty.2 A further inspection of the interaction 
between either low or high MIEG scores (i.e., scores 1 SD 
below and above the mean, respectively) showed that in 
both cases people with a low  MIEG attitude score tended 
to evaluate the drunk driver more harshly than the violent 
argument episode: [seriousness: t(37) = 4.94, p < .001, 
M drink-driver = 6.68, M violent argument = 5.63; 
penalty: t(37) = 1.93, p = .06, M drink-driver = 30.13, M 
violent argument = 19.35]. Conversely, participants with 
a high MIEG attitude score did not make any significant 
difference in evaluating them [seriousness: t(32) = 1.86, 
p = ns, M drink-driver = 6.62, M violent argument = 
6.38; penalty: t(26) = 1.24, p = ns, M drink-driver = 
23.52, M violent argument = 22.11].
Table 2. 
Two-way ANCOVAs of scenario and nationality with MIEG as a covariate.
Seriousness Anger Penalty (years)
F η2 F η2 F η2
Scenario (S) 19.10*** .08 4.19* .02 9.70** .05
MIEG 0.66 .00 1.38 .01 1.63 .01
S × MIEG 4.84* .02 1.93 .01 5.79* .03
Nationality (N) 10.18** .04 10.47*** .05 27.20*** .12
MIEG 0.66 .00 1.38 .01 1.63 .01
N × MIEG 10.99*** .05 10.48*** .05 21.18*** .10
Note. MIEG = Moral inclusion/exclusion of other groups. Seriousness and anger extended from 1 to 7.    
Penalty (years) extended from 0 to 100. 
*** p < .001. ** p < .01. * p < .05.
2. The analysis was performed including the level of education as well. No significant principal effect of education (seriousness: F = 0.17, p = 
ns, η2 = .00; anger: F = 0.91, p = ns, η2 = .00; penalty: F = 0.84, p = ns, η2 = .00) nor interaction with the scenario (seriousness: F = 2.10, p = ns, 
η2 = .01; anger: F = 1.50, p = ns, η2 = .01; penalty: F = 0.68, p = ns, η2 = .00) was found.
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By comparing the offender’s nationality regardless 
of the specific scenario (and thus considering the 
two scenarios as equivalent), data regarding each 
nationality were analyzed. Seriousness and anger were 
not significantly different, while participants tended to 
give a longer prison sentence to the Romanian offender 
(see Table 1).
A 2 way (nationality’s offender) ANCOVA with 
MIEG as a covariate was performed on each item (see 
Table 2). The interaction between offender’s nationality 
and MIEG was significant on all the items.3 A further 
inspection of the interaction between either low or 
high MIEG scores (i.e., scores 1 SD below and above 
the mean, respectively, see Figure 1) showed that, as 
we predicted, people with low MIEG attitude scores 
tended to evaluate Romanians more harshly than 
Italian offenders: seriousness [t(37) = -2.49, p < .01, 
M Italian = 5.84, M Romanian = 6.47]; anger [t(35) = 
-2.02, p < .05, M Italian = 5.00, M Romanian = 5.72]; 
penalty (years) [t(36) = -2.63, p < .01, M Italian = 
17.68, M Romanian = 31.81]. On the other hand, 
participants with high MIEG attitude scores tended to 
evaluate Italian offenders with more seriousness [t(33) 
= 2.36, p < .05, M Italian = 6.56, M Romanian = 6.15] 
and did not make any difference in evaluating anger 
[t(30) = 1.87, p = ns, M Italian = 5.13, M Romanian 
= 4.81] and penalty [t(26) = 0.93, p = ns, M Italian = 
23.33, M Romanian = 22.30].
Discussion
The aim of this study was to consider the influence 
of processes of moral inclusion and exclusion on 
individual judgments of a legal violation by an in-group 
vs. an out-group member. The first result concerns 
the evaluation of the two news items regardless of 
the offender’s nationality. Even though Italian Law 
considers the two events as similar given the fact 
that they both involve a death caused by an accident, 
participants consider the event involving the drunk 
driver to be more serious and consequently expect it to 
result in more years of imprisonment. We can assume 
that the different evaluation of the two scenarios can be 
attributed to the fact that recently, the topic of driving 
after drinking alcohol has been frequently debated in 
the Italian media. This may have led participants to be 
less tolerant in judging this event. It is worth noting 
that the interaction with MIEG shows that participants 
with exclusionary attitudes tend to have this different 
judgment of the two scenarios, while more inclusive 
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Figure 1.
Offender’s nationality × MIEG interaction among 
scenario variables.
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3. The analysis was performed including the level of education as well. No 
significant principal effect of education (seriousness: F = 0.17, p = ns, η2 = 
.00; anger: F = 0.91, p = ns, η2 = .00; penalty: F = 0.84, p = ns, η2 = .00) or 
interaction with nationality (seriousness: F = 3.45, p = ns, η2 = .02; anger: F = 
0.43, p = ns, η2 = .00; penalty: F = 1.80, p = ns, η2 = .01) was found.
Justice and Immigration (Research Article) — 47
participants do not. We assume that the effect of the 
public debate on increasing criminal sentences for the 
event involving the drunk driver is stronger for those 
who tend to have narrower moral boundaries and 
be more conformist and aligned with the in-group’s 
collective opinion (see Passini, 2016).
Secondly, as concerns the offender’s nationality, 
the results show that in general participants do not 
judge the actions of a Romanian  to be more serious 
compared with an Italian, and nor do these invoke 
more anger. A significant effect was found only on 
the number of years of imprisonment for the offender. 
That is, participants expect a stiffer punishment for 
Romanians. In general, results for all the participants 
reveal that people do not tend to evaluate the in-
group/out-group scenarios differently, even if they 
tend to expect stiffer sentencing. This may indicate a 
desire to avoid being negatively labeled as expressing 
exclusion by way of a two-fold strategy: apparently 
evaluating the in-group and out-group equally and 
then subsequently applying harsher punishments to 
the out-group lawbreakers.
Thirdly, the consideration of the moral inclusion of 
the other group variable more clearly shows the effect of 
nationality on all the questions concerning both scenarios. 
As we hypothesized, those people who tend to exclude 
some groups from their moral community indeed judge 
the Romanian more harshly than the Italian culprit. In 
line with other studies (Abrams, Randsley de Moura, & 
Travaglino, 2013), this result highlights the existence 
of a double standard of evaluation used by people with 
exclusionary attitudes, by which they exhibit a greater 
tolerance for transgressions committed by in-group culprits 
than out-group culprits. This is in line with Lima-Nunes, 
Pereira, and Correia (2013) who have found greater 
support for discrimination policies against immigrants 
when a restricted scope of justice was considered and 
when a belief in a just world was made salient. The effects 
of exclusion may indeed be influenced by perceived 
deservingness as well, by which groups included in the 
scope of justice may be seen as more deserving of positive 
treatment than those who are excluded or perceived as 
dissimilar (Hafer & Olson, 2003). 
On the contrary, those people who tend to have 
a more inclusive moral community do not exhibit any 
difference in their evaluation, though they consider 
the event with the Italian offender to be slightly more 
serious. This result may be explained by the so-called 
“black sheep effect” (Marques, Yzerbyt, & Leyens, 1988), 
by which in-group deviants are derogated more than 
out-group deviants. This is not to say that out-group 
members are not negatively evaluated. However, we can 
suppose that inclusive people expect in-group members 
to be more virtuous than out-group members because 
they are considered as models of behavior. In some 
cases, this could produce a less favorable evaluation of 
in-group offenders because of the violation of such an 
expectation (see (Abrams, et al., 2013).
Results related to the interaction between individual 
moral boundaries and the offender’s nationality are 
very important as they demonstrate the importance of 
considering how people apply justice to different social 
groups. People may indeed have a separate conception 
of justice for in-group vs. out-group members, which 
would have serious consequences for their objectivity 
in evaluating events. Indeed, people may focus more on 
certain elements (like nationality) that are not de facto 
relevant for the evaluation of that event. Moreover, it 
is worth noting that in the two scenarios the in- or out-
group status of both the offender and the victim were 
changed. As a result, the effect of moral inclusion/
exclusion on the judgment of the event may also 
depend on a different feeling of empathy experienced 
towards  in- or out-group victims. Although we did 
not investigate these scenarios, we can assume that 
participants with exclusionary attitudes would judge 
the event involving an out-group offender and an in-
group victim more harshly than when offender and 
victim are both out-group or in-group members. Indeed, 
in the former case the effects of both anger towards 
the out-group offender and solidarity with the in-group 
victim are added together.
This study has some limitations that should be 
considered in future research. First of all, the results are 
based on just one sample and participants were recruited 
using the internet. Future studies should replicate these 
results in larger samples and questionnaires should also 
be collected using more direct methods. Moreover, in the 
present study we did not ask participants whether they 
had had previous unpleasant encounters with justice 
(e.g. experiences of violence). These experiences may 
have affected their evaluation of the scenarios. Further, 
in the future other news items and other nationalities 
for the offenders should be used to confirm the observed 
results. In particular, other out-group nationalities 
should be used so as to generalize the present result 
to any morally excluded out-group. Additionally, the 
scenarios could be varied so that the culprit and the 
victim share the same group membership as well. 
Finally, given the impact of the media in structuring and 
influencing individual opinions, media exposure should 
also be taken into account. 
Notwithstanding these limitations, the present 
research project provides novel insights into the analysis 
of justice in an intergroup context and suggests that 
the effect of moral inclusion/exclusion processes on 
the evaluation of justice events should be considered. 
First, as Hafer and Olson (2003) have stated, research 
into social justice should reassess the consideration 
of distributive and procedural justice in light of the 
issue that the evaluation of justice also depends on 
the breadth of the moral community people refer to. 
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In this sense, the consideration of moral inclusion and 
exclusion processes might explain why the allocation of 
goods in a society and the administration of justice and 
legal proceedings are often unfair and undemocratic. 
Second, unlike more blatant prejudicial attitudes, 
moral exclusion processes are both more indirect and 
more socially accepted (Opotow, 1990; Passini, 2017). 
That is, the use of moral exclusion strategies may lead 
to harsher judgments of offenders due to their group 
membership, without that the evaluator had to face 
public disapproval. Moreover, moral exclusion processes 
are psychological mechanisms that serve to maintain the 
individual’s sense of moral integration (Passini, 2013). 
Individuals may indeed act unfairly in overcoming or 
minimizing a personal sense of guilt and justifying their 
own moral conduct and perception of justice. In this 
sense, it may be relevant to analyze the link between 
judgments of justice and intrapersonal and social 
acceptance in considering moral exclusion processes.
The findings of the present study have some 
practical implications as well. In particular, the issue 
that a prejudicial evaluation of the events and a 
narrower sense of justice emerge when people tend 
to exclude some out-groups from their scope of justice 
is relevant when considering strategies to reduce and 
offset the onset of prejudice against minorities. Making 
people aware of the way in which justice is differentialy 
applied depending on the people who are being judged 
could lead people to broaden their scope of justice. 
In this regard, the educational environment can play 
an important role in determining the individual’s 
awareness of their sense of justice and in mitigating 
prejudicial worldviews.
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